University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 17
Number 2 Winter, 1987

Article 7

1987

Recent Developments: Hodges v. Evisea Maritime
Co.: Duty to Correct or Warn of Conditions in
Longshoreman's Act
Jennifer Crump

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Crump, Jennifer (1987) "Recent Developments: Hodges v. Evisea Maritime Co.: Duty to Correct or Warn of Conditions in
Longshoreman's Act," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 17 : No. 2 , Article 7.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol17/iss2/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

Hodges v. Evisea Maritime Co.:
DUTY TO CORRECT OR WARN
OF CONDITIONS IN
LONGSHOREMAN'S ACT
In Hodges v. Evisea Maritime Co., 801
F.2d 6781986), the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit has held that under
the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (the "Act"), 33 U.S.C.
§ 905(b) (1982), before a shipowner can be
said to have a duty to correct or warn of a
condition arising during cargo operations,
the shipowner must be chargeable both
with knowledge of the condition and with
knowledge that despite the danger, the
stevedore is continuing its operations.
On July 26, 1977, the MIV Concordia
Sky, owneq by Evisea, was engaged in
cargo operations in Virginia when an unidentified and semiconscious man was discovered in the No.3 tween deck. The man,
unable to communicate and initially mistaken for a stowaway, was eventually taken
to a hospital. Several days later he was
identified as Gary Hodges, a longshoreman who had worked on the Concordia
Sky during its loading in Baltimore on
July 25th.
An investigation was subsequently conducted by Liberty Mutual, the compensation carrier for the stevedore employing
Hodges, Robert C. Herd & Co. No eyewitnesses to Hodges' injury were found.
Hodges had suffered serious head injuries,
leading him to claim a retrograde memory
loss and an inability to recall anything immediately prior to or following his apparent
accident. Because Liberty Mutual could
not satisfy its statutory burden to show
that Hodges' injury was not work related,
Hodges was awarded disability benefits
paid by Liberty Mutual pursuant to the
Act.
Hodges subsequently sued Evisea and
the charterer of the Concordia Sky, Concordia Line, alleging that the ship's negligence caused his injuries. Liberty Mutual
intervened as a plaintiff to protect its interest. A directed verdict was subsequently
entered in favor of Concordia Line.
Hodges' theory of negligence turned primarily on his assertion that prior to his injuries he was working in the ship's No.2
hold, that he returned to the previously
loaded No. 3 hold to obtain additional
dunnage, and fell through an open hatch
on the No.3 upper tween deck. Hodges
claimed that the vessel's owners were negligent both in leaving the hatch open and
in failing to provide adequate lighting or
other safety measures that would have prevented the fall.
The 1972 amendments to the Act eliminated the right oflongshoremen to recover

from a shipowner for acts caused byunseaworthiness, and further limited the right
to recover to those injuries caused by the
shipowner's negligence. ld. at 683. Under
the amendments, the determination of the
applicable standard of negligence was left
to the courts.
In Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v.
De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (1981), the
Supreme Court clarified the relative duties of shipowners and stevedores, under
the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. The Scindia Court concluded:
Section 905(b) of the LHWCA does
not impose upon the shipowner a continuing duty to inspect the cargo operations once the stevedore has begun
work. Rather, prior to the commencement of stevedoring operations, the
shipowner must "at least" exercise
ordinary care under the circumstances
to have the ship in such a condition
that an experienced stevedore, with
the exercise of reasonable care, can
carry out its operations. The shipowner must warn the stevedore ofhazards that are or should be known to the
vessel, if the hazards are not known or
should be known to the stevedore. The
vessel is also liable, after the stevedoring work has begun, if it actively involves itself in the cargo operations
and its negligence causes an injury, or
if it fails to exercise due care to intervene to protect longshoremen from
hazards under the active control of the
vessel during the stevedoring operation.
ld. at 166-168.
The Hodges court determined that there
was evidence from which the jury could
conclude that under Scindia, the owner's
or crew of the vessel had a duty to intervene and exercise their control over the
No.3 hold to eliminate the dangerous conditions of the open hatch and poor lighting.
The court also concluded that there was
sufficient evidence of a breach of this duty
by the vessel.
Having held that the jury instructions
relating to the allocation of duties of care
with respect to dangerous conditions between the vessel and stevedore during ongoing stevedoring operations were inadequate under Scindia, the Hodges court
found it necessary to reverse and remand
the case for a new trial. The sole jury instruction given by the trial court addressing the relative duties of stevedores and
shipowners once stevedoring operations are
under way was the following: "It is not
contended by the plaintiffs that the shipowner had a duty to superintend or oversee

the operations of the stevedoring company
or its employees, and the shipowner in fact
had no such duty under the facts of this
case." Hodges 801 F.2d at 686. The court
stated that the evidence required a more
detailed instruction delineating the limits,
of the shipowner's duty to intervene during cargo operations with respect to the
dangers posed by the open hatch and unlit
hold.
Prior to the Hodges decision, the Fourth
Circuit had yet to give effect to the 1972
amendments to the Act. The Hodges court
adopted the holding of the Supreme Court
in Scindia with respect to the standard of
negligence applicable to shipowners under
the Act.
This decision places a heavy burden on
stevedores to avoid injuries caused by obvious hazards. The high standard of care
now placed on stevedores is apparent from
the fact that the duty of shipowners exists
only as a supplement to the duty of stevedores in supervising its longshoremen so
that injuries will not result from obvious
or warned of defects of the vessel. Thus,
under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act., 33 U.S.C. § 905
(1982), the duties of the shipowner are
now limited, and the primary burden to
avoid injuries is now placed upon the
stevedore.

- Jennifer Crump

The May Dep't Stores Company
v. Harryman: "BUSINESS
PREMISES" UNDER WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION EXTENDED
The Court of Appeals of Maryland in
May Dep't Stores Co. v. Harryman, 307
Md. 692, 517 A.2d 71 (1986), has concluded that an employee who was injured
on an assigned parking lot, while she was
proceeding directly to her workplace, is
entitled to an award under the Workers'
Compensation Act, Md. Ann. Code art.
101, §§ 15 and 67(6), (the Act). The decision extends, under certain circumstances,
to situations where the lot is not directly
owned by the employer.
The employee, Muriel Harryman, was
employed by The May Department Stores
Company, T/A The Hecht Company
(Hecht's). The store in question was one of
many tenants at a county mall, which is
surrounded by a parking lot. On November 28, 1983, Ms. Harryman parked her
car in the designated parking area, pursuant to a lease agreement between the employer and the owner of the lot. As she approached the mall entrance (about two car
lengths from her vehicle), a person came
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